In this paper we provide a categorical interpretation of the rst-order Hoare logic of a small programming language, by giving a weakest precondition semantics for the language. To this end, we extend the well-known notion of a ( rst-order) hyperdoctrine to include partial maps. The most important new aspect of the resulting partial ( rst order) hyperdoctrine is a di erent notion of morphism between the bres. We also use this partial hyperdoctrine to give a model for Beeson's Partial Function Logic such that (a version of) his axiomatization is complete w.r.t. this model. This shows the usefulness of the notion independent of its intended use as a model for Hoare logic.
Introduction
In this paper we provide a category theoretical interpretation for the rst-order Hoare logic of a simple programming language. The programming language is based on a signature that contains the basic sorts, function symbols and relation symbols with their associated type where a type is a list of sorts. The statements of the language consist of the usual while-programs. The rst-order logic is based on the same signature. Hoare logic (Hoare 1969 , Apt 1981 , Cousot 1990 ) is obtained by mixing programs and rst-order formulae. The rst-order language is intended to be used for describing the properties of a set of variables (the \store"). The intuitive reading of the Hoare triple f gSf g is: if the store initially has property , then the store resulting from the execution of S has property . This already indicates that there are essentially two di erent views of the meaning of Hoare triples. The liberal view says that f gSf g means: \if initially holds and the program terminates then holds". The total view says: \if initially holds, then the program terminates and holds". We will cover both viewpoints, but take the total viewpoint as the more fundamental one: the rst one will be a derived notion.
In order to obtain a categorical model for Hoare triples, we turn to a conceptually very clear categorical model for rst-order logic. It is based on the notion of hyperdoctrines as introduced by Lawvere (1969 Lawvere ( , 1970 . A detailed description can be found in Pitts (1989b) (see also Hyland, Johnstone and Pitts 1980) . We give an informal description. The model is an indexed category. It consists of a category C (the base category) that is used for giving meaning to the sorts and terms: to every sort one assigns an object in C and to every function symbol an arrow in C. By assigning projections to variables, one can give meaning to all terms. With each object A 2 C, a pre-Heyting algebra (pHa) H(A) is associated, called the bre at A. A pre-Heyting algebra is a pre-ordered set that has join, meet, least element, largest element and implication (see Johnstone (1982) for a fuller discussion). The pHa's H(A) are used to interpret the rst order formulae. One assigns to every relation symbol of type A an element in H( A] ]). The meaning of complex formulae is built up using the operators on the pHa. To each f : A ! B 2 C, a Heyting morphism f : H(B) ! H(A) is associated. That is, f preserves all the structure. f corresponds to substitution. Adjoints to these substitution morphisms are used for the interpretation of quanti cation.
Inspired by ideas from Wagner (1987) and from the point of view of programs as predicate transformers we now want to model programs as mappings H(A) ! H(A), where A is an object representing the store. Such a mapping should correspond to à weakest precondition functor'. In general, however, a program designates only a partial function. As a result, a weakest precondition functor need not be a Heyting morphism. Speci cally, depending on the interpretation of Hoare triples (liberal or total), they do not map ? to ?, or > to >. So we need to weaken the notion of Heyting morphism to cope with this. The resulting functor is called an almost Heyting morphism.
Having generalized the morphisms between the bres, we can generalize the notion of hyperdoctrine altogether: We take for the base category a`cartesian' category of partial maps. There are several approaches in the literature to a categorical treatment of partial maps (DiPaola and Heller 1987 , Obtu lowicz 1986 , Hoehnke 1977 , Rosolini 1986 ), see Robinson and Rosolini (1988) for a good survey. In this paper we have chosen for the approach by Rosolini (1986) since his notion of partial map seems to t in the present framework most easily. In particular, we need not to assume the existence of a`nowhere de ned' map between arbitrary objects in the base category, in contrast to the dominical categories of DiPaola and Heller (1987) . Also, Rosolini's notion of domain of de nition of a partial map seems to be more appropriate in this context than Obtu lowicz's notion (1986) . We have coined the name partial hyperdoctrine for the resulting structures. Partial hyperdoctrines are interesting for their own sake: we are able to give a completeness theorem for Beeson's partial function logic (Beeson 1986) .
Partial hyperdoctrines can be used to give semantics to Hoare triples in several ways. In this paper we have concentrated on inductively de ning weakest precondition functors as almost Heyting morphisms. On the other hand, we can use an operational or denotational semantics to assign to each program a (partial) arrow in the base category. These arrows then canonically yield weakest precondition functors.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give a brief review of rst order hyperdoctrines. In section 3 we de ne our notion of partial hyperdoctrines. We also show that the category of partial maps of a logos gives rise to a partial hyperdoctrine. In section 1 we show that the class of partial hyperdoctrines forms a sound and complete class of models for Beeson's partial function logic. In section 5 we show how one can use partial hyperdoctrines to model Hoare logic.
Hyperdoctrines
In this section we give a brief review of rst order hyperdoctrines. This is primarily done as an introduction to partial hyperdoctrines that we de ne in the next section. The de nitions here should be contrasted with the corresponding ones in that section. For a more comprehensive treatment of the theory, consult Pitts (1989b Obviously, formulae may contain free variables. Just like with the terms, we will consider formulae-in-context.
A hyperdoctrine is a categorical structure that will act as the target for an interpretation of the rst order language over a signature. It is given by the following data. | The other connectives use the meet^, join _ etc. of the pre-Heyting algebra and the case 8y: (x) is analogous to existential quanti cation.
We now de ne, for a signature and an interpretation of the rst order language over that signature, satis ability for sequents in context
Hyperdoctrines with Partial Maps
In this section the notion of partial hyperdoctrines is de ned. Partial hyperdoctrines serve as models for a Partial Function Logic and the Hoare Logic of a small programming language. Partial hyperdoctrines are closely related to ordinary hyperdoctrines. n particular, every hyperdoctrine is a partial hyperdoctrine. Just like in the latter case Set and total functions together with the powerset operator is the canonical example of a hyperdoctrine, in this case the category Pfn of sets and partial functions together with the powerset operator is the canonical example of a partial hyperdoctrine. The reader should bear this example in mind during the next de nitions. Later on we prove that (Pfn; P) is indeed a partial hyperdoctrine.
p-Categories
Recall that the base category is used for the interpretation of the algebraic part of the logic: the terms. Recently, Rosolini (1986) (see also the excellent survey paper by Robinson and Rosolini (1988) ) has de ned an algebraic notion of partiality. In this section we give a review of the theory.
De nition 3.1. A p-category is a category C endowed with 1 a bifunctor : C C ! C which is called the product; Extending this idea, Rosolini (1986) Identities are given by pairs (1; 1). Composition of two partial maps (m; f) and (n; g), (n; g) (m; f), is de ned by the following pullback square.
It is not di cult to show that P(A; M) is a p-category. Note that there exists a faithful embedding A , ! P(A; M) which sends an object A to itself and an arrow f : A ! B to
(1 A ; f). The partial product structure is given by (m; f) (n; g) = (m n; f g). Projections and diagonals are inherited from A. It is elementary to show that dom((m; f)) = (m; m). The following theorem is taken from Rosolini (1986) , and Robinson and Rosolini (1988) .
Theorem 3.2. Each p-category C is equivalent to a full subcategory of P(A; M) for a suitable category with nite products A and dominion M.
Using this theorem, it is easy to prove properties of p-categories. In the sequel we need the following lemma. We have the following proposition (Robinson and Rosolini 1988) . In this proposition, C t is the subcategory of C consisting of all objects and total arrows. Proposition 3.5. If C is a p-category with a one-element object 1, then C t has all nite products. In particular, 1 is the terminal object and the product of A and B is A B.
Conversely, if A has nite products and M is a dominion in A, then P(A; M) has a one element object. 
Partial hyperdoctrines
In this section we de ne the notion of partial hyperdoctrine. As remarked in the introduction, we rst need the notion of an`almost' Heyting morphism.
De nition 3.7. Let A and B be pre-Heyting algebras. A map F : A ! B is an almost
Note that an almost Heyting morphism F is a Heyting morphism i F(>) = >. We denote the category of pre-Heyting algebras and almost Heyting morphisms by pHAlg ? . De nition 3.8. A Partial (First Order) Hyperdoctrine (C; H) consists of the following data:
1 A p-category C with a one-element object 1. 2 A pseudo-functor H : C op ! pHAlg ? . As usual we write f for H(f).
3 For all arrows f : A ! B 2 C, (dom(f)) (P ) = P^f (>) for every P 2 H(A). 1 If f is total, then f is a Heyting morphism.
For the next corollary, if C is a p-category, then C t denotes the subcategory consisting of all objects in C and all total arrows. Corollary 3.10. Let (C; H) be a partial hyperdoctrine. Then (C t ; H) is a hyperdoctrine. Example 3.11. Pfn can be made into a partial hyperdoctrine by stipulating that H(A) = P(A) for all objects A 2 Pfn. P(A) obviously is a Heyting algebra, where join is , meet is \ etc. Then f = f ?1 . That is, if f : A ! B then for X 2 H(B),
If f is a total map, then there exist both left and right adjoints to f . We denote these by 9 f and 8 f , respectively. 9 f (X) = fb 2 B : 9a 2 X:f(a) = bg 8 f (X) = fb 2 B : 8a 2 A:f(a) = b ! a 2 Xg
In particular, 9 A;B (X) = 9 0 = fb 2 B : 9a 2 A:ha; bi 2 Xg 8 A;B (X) = 8 0 = fb 2 B : 8a 2 A:ha; bi 2 Xg Note that we do not have left adjoints 9 f to f in general since f does not preserve > and hence cannot be a right adjoint itself. We do have, however, always right adjoints 8 f to f . The (almost) Beck-Chevalley conditions are satis ed, for example f (8 A;C (X)) = f (fc 2 C : 8a 2 A:ha; ci 2 Xg) = fb 2 B : f(b)#^8a 2 A:ha; f(b)i 2 Xg = fb 2 B : 8a 2 A:ha; f(b)i 2 Xg \ f (>) = fb 2 B : 8a 2 A:ha; bi 2 fha; bi : ha; f(b)i 2 Xgg \ f (>) = 8 A;B (fha; bi : ha;
It is easy to check that f is monotonic, commutes with and \ and f (;) = ;. We have f (>) = fa 2 A : f(a)#g is the subset of A on which f is de ned and this is in general less than A. Also,
Partial maps in a logos
Recently, Freyd de ned the following class of models for Intuitionistic Predicate Calculus (Freyd and Scedrov 1991) . The models are called logoi and are closely related to triposes (Hyland, Johnstone and Pitts 1980) . We use the de nition given by Pitts (1989a) .
De nition 3.12. A logos is a category C such that 1 C has all nite limits. 2 For each object X 2 C, the partially ordered set Sub(X) of subobjects of X has all nite joins.
3 For each arrow f : Y ! X 2 C, the operation f : Sub(X) ! Sub(Y ) of pulling back along f has both a left and a right adjoint, denoted by 9 f and 8 f , respectively.
in C, it is the case that g 9 f = 9 h k . Clause 4 in the above de nition is the Beck-Chevalley condition for 9. In this context it implies the same condition for 8. It is not di cult to see that for a logos C, the structure (C; Sub) is a rst order hyperdoctrine. Interpretation of a rst order language in C is essentially the same as the interpretation in (C; Sub). We have a remark on the interpretation of equality in a logos. On the one hand, we interpret equality using the equality predicate . On the other hand, one can de ne the value of a formula f(x) = g(x) by the equalizer of (the interpretation of) f and g (see e.g. Makkai and Reyes 1977 So, in a logos, the two descriptions of equality coincide. If C is a logos and M is a dominion in C, then P(C; M) is a p-category with one element object. In this section we show that we can endow P(C; M) with the structure of a partial hyperdoctrine. Given an object A 2 C, the bre H(A) is given by Sub(A), the collection of subobjects of A. The pullback operation (m; f) is de ned as follows.
De nition 3.13. Let (m; 
For the next series of lemmas, we x a logos C and a dominion M in C. We furthermore x the following arrows. Let m : A ! B 2 C be monic, and let f : A ! C 2 C be an arbitrary map. Then (m; f) is an arbitrary partial map in P(C; M). Lemma 3.14. 1 m 9 m = 1 2 m 8 m = 1 Proof. m : A ! B is monic i the following diagram is a pullback square:
The claim now follows from the Beck-Chevalley conditions.
Lemma 3.15. m ( ) a m ( ). From this lemma it follows that 9 m ( ) = m ( ) and hence (m; f) can also be given by 9 m f . We will use both descriptions in the sequel. Corollary 3.16. (m; f) a 8 f m . Lemma 3.17. Let ; 2 Sub(A). Then Proof. The rst part of the lemma is straightforward. For the second part, every square in the following diagram is a pullback. 
Proof. For the rst part we have
For the second part, consider the following pullback diagram. 
Beeson's Partial Function Logic
Traditionally, it is assumed that terms (over some signature) always denote. However, one frequently uses functions, such as x 7 ! x ?1 on the real numbers, that are only partially de ned. Scott (1979) recognized that there is a need for a logic which can deal with partiality (c.f. Van Dalen and Troelstra 1988) . In order to do so, he introduced an existence predicate E, where Et has the intuitive interpretation \t exists". In his logic, free variables are treated purely schematic so that any term t may be substituted for them. On the other hand, bound variables are supposed to range over existing objects only.
Later on, Beeson (1986) introduced another reading of such a language: free variables are supposed to range over existing objects. Terms may still be unde ned. Hence we have axioms Ex for all variables x.
In this section we give a formulation of Beeson's Logic of Partial Terms and show that the deductive system is sound with respect to an interpretation in partial hyperdoctrines.
Given a signature , the collection of atomic formulae consists of s = t, R(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) and s#. We form the collection of all rst order formulae over in the usual way. The reading of the formula s# is s exists (Beeson introduced the predicate (?)# rather than E(?) in order to make a distinction between his logic and the logic of Scott). The formal system is given in A n . This interpretation is called the liberal interpretation. The fact that the liberal semantics is expressible in the total semantics forms the basis of a translation between the two corresponding logics as described in section 4.3 below. As the names already indicate, the interpretations closely resemble the two di erent interpretations of Hoare triples. The liberal interpretation seems to be new. The interesting aspect of this interpretation is that it enables one not to consider termination, or existence, of terms.
We de ne the satis ability relation j = for a partial hyperdoctrine as usual:
] ] Note that due to the two possible interpretations of the atomic formulae there are two satis ability relations j = t and j = l , respectively.
The deductive systems
The rules in Table 1 together with the rules in Table 2 form the deductive system for the total interpretation. We have a few remarks on the notation. 1 We use the convention that in the rules contexts are dropped, except when they change.
2 The side condition x y in rule (W k) denotes that there exists an injective function : jxj ! jyj such that x i = y (i) .
3 The expression s=x] denotes the formula after substituting s for x (where it is assumed that s is free for x). Note that a formula may arise as s=x] for several choices of s and x. In particular, in rule (Equ) we may choose which free variables x in x=x 0 ]`used to be' x 0 .
As usual the inclusion of a set A of axioms ` in the system is allowed. Derivability in this (extended) system is denoted by`A t . When the collection A of axioms is empty, or is clear from the context, we abbreviate`A t to`t. Likewise, the rules in Table 1 together with the rules in Table 3 , if necessary extended with a collection of axioms A, form the deductive system for the liberal interpretation. We denote derivability in this system bỳ A l , or by`l. Note that in the system for the total interpretation, we do not have an axiom x# for variables x. This formula is derivable.
Note that the deductive system is slightly di erent from the one given by Beeson (1986) . It is the many-sorted, sequent variant of Beeson's system where the domains may be empty. The system is furthermore given in a so-called adjoint calculus formulation which is tailored towards a categorical interpretation. For instance, rule (!) expresses the fact that the operation ! ( ) is right adjoint to ( )^ which is the case in any Heyting algebra (Johnstone 1982) . The rules for quanti cation express that one can view universal quanti cation as right adjoint to weakening: since all sequents in the rules are assumed to be well-formed, does not contain an occurrence of a free variable y. Hence the formula above the line can be viewed as (x) weakened to (y; x). Likewise, existential quanti cation is left adjoint to weakening. Rule (Equ) deals with equality. We would expect the following equality axioms:
1`x = x (x) 2 x = x 0`x0 = x (x; x 0 ) 3 x = x 0^x0 = x 00`x = x 00 (x; x 0 ; x 00 ) 4 x = x 0^t #`t x 0 =x] = t (x; x 0 ; y), where t(x; y) is a term-in-context 5 x = x 0^ ` x 0 =x] (x; x 0 ; y), where (x; y) is a formula-in-context. Lawvere (1969 Lawvere ( , 1970 .
Soundness
In this section we show that the total proof system for the logic is sound with respect to the total interpretation. We need a substitution lemma. To x notation: Suppose (x) is a formula-in-context x = x 1 ; : : : ; x n where x i : A i say. Assume that for all 1 i n there is a term-in-context s i (y) of sort A i where y = y 1 ; : : : ; y m and y j : B j say. Then s=x](y) denotes the formula in context y resulting from simultaneously substituting s i for x i .
We have the following well-known proposition. Proposition 4.2. (Frobenius Reciprocity) Let X; Y be preorders with binary meets and implications and let f : X ! Y be monotonic. Suppose f has a left adjoint g. Then f preserves implications i 8x 2 X; y 2 Y:g(y^f(x)) = g(y)^x.
We use this proposition on 9 K;I a ( 0 K;I ) : since 0 K;I is total, ( 0 K;I ) preserves implications. The logical intuition then is that 9x:( (x; y)^ (y)) a`(9x: (x; y))^ (y) For a fuller discussion of Frobenius reciprocity, see Hyland, Johnstone and Pitts (1980) and Pitts (1989b Proof. Using the internal language of the hyperdoctrine (see section 4.4) we de ne for a term t(x) and a formula (x), (8 t x: )(y) to be (8x:(y = t ! ))(y). Then t#^ t=y]` (x) `8 t x: (y)
is a derived rule. From this the claim follows.
Relating total and liberal interpretation
In this section we de ne translations between the two logics. First we give a translation T as suggested by the de nition of ] ] l that is used to map the liberal system onto the total system. We de ne T by induction on the structure of . The base case is given below.
R(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) 7 ! s 1 #^ ^s n #! R(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) s = t 7 ! s#^t#! s = t
Next we give the translation L to map the total system onto the liberal system. The base cases are given by:
R(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) 7 ! s 1 #^ ^s n #^R(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) s = t 7 ! s#^t#^s = t
The translations furthermore commute with all connectives, e.g., T( ^ ) = T( )^T ( ) and so on. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 4.9. For all ; 2 ( ),
Proof. Induction on the depth of proof in the rst two cases and induction on the structure of in the second two cases. Straightforward propositional reasoning.
Proposition 4.10. For all ; 2 ( ), j = l i T( ) j = t T( ) (relative to an interpretation I).
Proof. We prove that for all 2 ( ), (
We proceed by an induction on the structure of . We only prove the base case (s = t).
The proposition follows by de nition of j =.
Corollary 4.11. (Liberal Soundness) If is a signature and I is an interpretation for , then the collection of j = l is closed under the rules in Tables 1 and 3 . Proof. Suppose that for some collection of formulas, 1 j = l 1 ; : : : ; n j = l n hold.
Suppose that there exists (an instantiation of) a rule in which the set of premisses is A = f 1`l 1 ; : : : ; n`l n g and that the conclusion of that instantiation is `l . We have to show that j = l holds. Now, trivially, `A l is derivable. Hence, by Proposition 4.9, T( )`T (A) t T( ). By assumption and Proposition 4.10, T( 1 ) j = t T( 1 ); : : : ; T( n ) j = t T( n ). Hence, by Soundness, T( ) j = t T( ) and, again by Proposition 4.10, j = l .
Classifying partial hyperdoctrines
In this section we show how to construct a so-called classifying partial hyperdoctrine out of any theory in the logic of partial terms. This construction is the categorical version of term models and the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra for a propositional theory. At the end of this section we also brie y indicate how we can associate to each partial hyperdoctrine a theory, called its internal language. By the Soundness Theorem 4.7, we can reason about partial hyperdoctrines using their internal language; any provable sequent in this internal language is valid in the hyperdoctrine.
First of all, a theory T is essentially given by a collection of axioms A. We use this collection below. Next we identify the base category C(T ). The objects in C(T ) are nite lists of distinct variables x. The product of x and y is given by x y 0 , where y 0 is a suitable renaming of y. Note that this renaming can be made functional in x and y, for instance by xing an order on the variables. The one-element object 1 is the empty list . Below we give an inductive de nition of the class of arrows in C(T ). These will be equivalence classes of 4-tuples of the following form (x; y; (t 1 ; : : : ; t n ); )) where t i has the same sort as y i and has free variables contained in x, and where the free variables of , which denotes Dom(f), are contained in x.
The class of arrows in C(T ) is generated by the following cases. 1 (x; y; x; >) is an arrow if x i and y i have the same type. This arrow is an isomorphism between objects of`the same type'. In particular, the identity arrow 1 x = (x; x; x; >). 2 The diagonal : x ! x x is de ned as (x; x x 0 ; x x; >). 3 The rst projection x;y : x y ! x is de ned as (x y 0 ; x; x; >). The second projection 0 x;y : x y ! y is de ned as (x y 0 ; y; y 0 ; >). 4 The arrow t x : x ! 1 is de ned as (x; ; ; >). 5 Every function symbol f 2 F induces the arrow (x; y; f(x); f(x)#), where x; y correspond to the type of f.
Composition is de ned as (y; z; t; ) (x; y; s; ) = (x; z; t s=y]; ^ s=y])
The product of two arrows is de ned as (x; y; s; ) (x 0 ; y 0 ; t; ) = (x x 0 ; y y 0 ; s t; ^ ) where we have assumed that all sequences of variables are disjoint. The equivalence relation is de ned as follows: (x 1 ; y 1 ; s; ) (x 2 ; y 2 ; t; ) if and only if
We have (x; y; s; ) v (x; y; t; ) i ` and `s = t. Furthermore, dom((x; y; s; )) = (x; x; x; ).
To each object x 2 C(T ) we associate the collection of all formulae in context x, pre-ordered by`A t . We denote this collection by (x). For technical reasons we divide out the pre-order`. The operations^; _; : : : are just the syntactic ones.
An arrow (x; y; s; ) in C(T ) induces the following pullback functor from the bre (y)
to the bre (x): (x; y; s; ) ( ) = ^ s=y] We furthermore adjoin 8 y x and 9 y x from the bre (y x) to the bre (x) given by 8 y x ( ) = 8y: and 9 y x ( ) = 9y: , respectively. We denote the resulting structure by (C(T ); ).
Proposition 4.12. For each theory T , (C(T ); ) is a partial hyperdoctrine.
Proof. We need to check all requirements. First of all, it is easy to see that the category C(T ) is a p-category. Obviously, given an object x, the bre (x) is a pre-Heyting algebra.
We have | (Pseudo) Functoriality of ( ) is straightforward. = (x; y; s; (x)) (>)(
x; y; s; (x)) ( 1 ) ! (x; y; s; (x)) ( 2 ) | (dom((x; y; t; ))) = (x; x; x; ) = 1 ^ . | 9 y x and 8 y x are adjoint to ( 0 ) , which follows immediately from rules (9) and (8), respectively. It is also easy that these satisfy the Beck-Chevalley, resp., almost Beck-Chevalley condition.
| Finally, x = x 0 is the required value of the left adjoint to at > by rule (Equ).
We now relate derivability in some partial function logic T to satisfaction in the clas- Proof. Induction on the structure of .
Theorem 4.14. For all formulae ; , ` (y) i j = (y).
Proof. Immediate since the order on the bres of (C(T ); ) is de ned as`.
Corollary 4.15. (Completeness)`t (resp.`l) is complete with respect to j = t (resp. j = l ). Conversely, with every partial hyperdoctrine (C; H) we associate an internal language L(C; H) speci ed by | every object A 2 C is a type in L(C; H); The constructions of classifying hyperdoctrine and internal language suggest an equivalence between the categories of partial hyperdoctrines and partial function logics (with maps that preserve all structure). However, this is not the case. Consider a hyperdoctrine (C; H) and two arrows f; g 2 C such that hf; gi = >. Note that in this case f need not equal g in C. But both f and g are mapped onto the same arrow in the classifying hyperdoctrine for the internal language of (C; H). Hence this structure and (C; H) are not equivalent. Note that if it was the case that for all arrows f and g, hf; gi = > implies f = g, then there would be an equivalence.
Hoare Logic
In this section we show how one can use the theory of the previous sections to give an interpretation for the Hoare logic of a simple programming language.
Syntax
Given a signature , we can build the set of rst order sentences ( ) based on this signature. Likewise, we can de ne the set of while-programs L( ) over the signature. determines the set of terms which we use in assignments and Boolean expressions build up from the terms and relation symbols and equality.
Formally, the syntax of the language L( ) is given by the following grammar.
S where x is a list of variables containing all the variables occurring in , and S. We view formulae as conditions on program variables, so we do not distinguish between them and logical variables', contrary to some texts (see Cousot (1990) ).
A Hoare triple f gSf g has two readings: | a total interpretation: \if before the execution of S holds, then S terminates and holds after the execution of S"; or | a liberal interpretation: \if before the execution of S holds and S terminates, then holds after the execution of S".
We rst give a semantics for the total interpretation. We then show how we can use this semantics to give meaning to the liberal interpretation.
Semantics of Hoare logic with total terms
Hoare logic is based on a signature . The rst order language ( ) has interpretations in (partial) hyperdoctrines as given in the previous section. For the moment, we assume that all function symbols f 2 F are mapped onto total arrows in C. In the next section we will drop this requirement. We furthermore assume that the collection of Boolean Proof. Induction on the structure of S. The base case holds by de nition and is even a full Heyting morphism. The induction step follows immediately from the induction hypothesis, except for the case of the while statement and implication. Here we have by induction hypothesis that _ wtp(W n ; P ! Q) = _ (wtp(W n ; P) ! wtp(W n ; Q))^wtp(W n ; >)] (2)
We have to prove this expression equal to _ wtp(W n ; P) ! _ wtp(W n ; Q) ^_ wtp(W n ; >)
The proof that (2) (3) is trivial. For (3) (2), we need two claims.
Claim 1 For all n, wtp(W n ; >)^wtp(W n+1 ; Q) wtp(W n ; Q). low by propositional reasoning in the internal language of the Heyting algebra (Johnstone 1982) , in which each element of the algebra occurs as a constant.
A deductive system
In this section we prove that the standard deductive system for Hoare logic is sound with respect to the liberal weakest precondition interpretation given in the previous section. The system is given in i from which the claim follows.
Semantics of Hoare logic with partial terms
In this section we develop the semantics for Hoare Logic when we allow for partial maps in the base category C. Such situations often occur in daily life, for instance division is a partial function, or the pop of an empty stack is unde ned. Also this extension is necessary for dealing with user de ned functions F for which we allow (boolean) expressions like F(x) = 3 in the conditional of an if-statement.
Technically, the allowance of partial functions causes on the one hand that assignments no longer always terminate, and on the other hand that the Boolean expression in a conditional may diverge. Our framework can easily deal with the rst problem. We can solve the second problem by assuming that the base category C contains a Boolean object.
De nition 5.11. A Boolean object B is an object together with two arrows t; f : 1 ! B such that 1 j = 8b 2 B:(b = t _ b = f); 2 j = 8b 2 B::(b = t^b = f).
On this abstract level, we can just say that the conditional of an if-statement simply is a term of type B. This viewpoint has been advocated by Tennent (1987) earlier and it re ects the practice in languages such as ML, Haskell, etc. In this way, we essentially have a three-valued logic internal to the programming language: its third value is`unde ned'. In order to model more realistic languages, we can assume that we have arrows _ = : A A ! B for all (or for some relevant) objects A 2 C, and arrows and; or; : : : : B B ! B.
These arrows should obey j = ((t 1 _ = t 2 ) = t) $ (t 1 #^t 2 #^t 1 = t 2 ) j = ((t 1 _ = t 2 ) = f) $ (t 1 #^t 2 #^:(t 1 = t 2 )) and so on. We now can give a deductive system for the Hoare logic with partial terms. It is listed in Table 5 (c.f. Tennent (1987) ). The proof of the Soundness Theorem is analogous to the proof of the Soundness Theorem in the previous section.
Theorem 5.15. The deductive system in Table 5 is sound.
Discussion
In this paper we have shown that we can integrate in a natural way a notion of category with partial maps and (tensor) products with the notion of hyperdoctrines to obtain a structure suited for the interpretation of partial function logic. These structures also arise in the modeling of Hoare logic. Furthermore we have studied the Hoare logic of a small programming language. Obviously we can extend the language with simple constructs like (parameter-less) procedures or functions. The section on Hoare logic with partial terms becomes relevant as soon as we allow user de ned functions. Recently, Pitts (1990) used categorical structures quite related to ours to model socalled Evaluation Logic, which is a logic designed to over computations and which is based on Moggi's notion of computational monad (Moggi 1991) . Hoare logic can be seen as a special case of Evaluation Logic. It is an interesting question to see how Pitts' and our approach to Hoare logic relate.
